A protected password change protocol by Wang, Ren-Chiun et al.
 
1
A protected password change protocol 
 
Ren-Chiun Wang1, Chou-Chen Yang2 and Kun-Ru Mo3 
 
Department of Information Management1 
Chaoyang University of Technology 
168 Gifeng E.Rd., Wufeng, Taichung County, Taiwan 413, R.O.C. 
Corresponding author 
Email: chiunchiunwang@yahoo.com.tw 
 
Department of Management Information System2 
National Chung Hsing University 
250 Kuo Kuang Road, 402 Taichung, Taiwan, R.O.C. 
Email: cc_yang@nchu.edu.tw 
 
Department of Information Management3 
Min Chuan University 
No. 250, section 5, Chung Shan North Road, Taipei City 111, Taiwan R.O.C. 
Email: stephen@sanyo.com.tw 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
A protected password change protocol 
 
Abstract 
  Some protected password change protocols were proposed. However, the previous 
protocols were easily vulnerable to several attacks such as denial of service, password 
guessing, stolen-verifier and impersonation attacks etc. Recently, Chang et al. proposed a 
simple authenticated key agreement and protected password change protocol for enhancing 
the security and efficiency. In this paper, authors shall show that password guessing, denial of 
service and known-key attacks can work in their password change protocol. At the same time, 
authors shall propose a new password change protocol to withstand all the threats of security. 
Keyword: authentication, cryptanalysis, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, password change. 
 
1. Introduction 
Password is a short secret. Hence, it is easily be remembered by communication parties and 
can enhance the efficiency of the scheme. Many password-based authentication schemes were 
proposed [4-7]. However, the disadvantages of the scheme are easily vulnerable to the 
guessing, replay, denial of service and stolen-verifier attacks etc. 
Beside that, a key agreement scheme should be considered into a password-based 
authentication scheme for enhancing the security. Recently, Peyravian and Zunic [8] proposed 
an authentication scheme for protecting password transmission by using one-way hash 
function [9]. In 2001, Tseng et al. [10] pointed out that their scheme was vulnerable to the 
server spoofing attack. At the same time, Tseng proposed an improvement based on the 
Diffie-Hellman scheme [2]. Not only that, many attacks and improvements were discussed 
continually [3-4, 11-13]. 
Recently, Chang et al. [1] proposed a simple authenticated key agreement and protected 
password change protocol for overcoming the above attacks. In this paper, authors shall show 
that Chang et al.’s password change protocol is vulnerable to the known-key, off-line 
password guessing and denial of service attacks. At the same time, authors shall propose a 
new password changing protocol to withstand all the threats of security.. 
Next section, authors shall review Chang et al.’s password change protocol and show that 
the protocol’s weaknesses. In Section 3, authors shall propose a new password changing 
protocol. Finally, authors shall make a conclusion for this paper. 
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2. Review of Chang et al.’s password change protocol 
In this section, authors shall go over Chang et al.’s password change protocol and show that 
their protocol’s weaknesses as follows. 
 
2.1 Chang et al.’s scheme 
  Let p and q are two large prime numbers. g is a generator with order q in GF(p). Two  
communication parties, Alice and Bob, share a secret password pw. 
 
Step 1: Alice selects a random number a and computes RA = ga mod p. Alice sends (RA ⊕ pw 
|| RA ⊕ new pw) to Bob. 
Step 2: Bob sends (RB || H(KB, RA)) to Alice, where b is chosen by Bob, RB = gb mod p, KB = 
b
AR  mod p and H() denotes a secure one-way hash function. Note that RA = (RA ⊕ 
pw) ⊕ pw and new pw = RA ⊕ (RA ⊕ new pw). 
Step 3: Alice sends (H(KA, RB) ⊕ new pw) to Bob, where KA = aBR  mod p. And then Bob 
uses the recovered new pw to retrieve H(KA, RB). If H(KA, RB) is equal to H(KB, RB), 
Bob accepts this new password new pw. 
 
2.2 Weaknesses on Chang et al.’s protocol 
Off-line password guessing attack: The attacker can first intercept (RA ⊕ pw || RA ⊕ new  
pw) from the communication channel in the Step 1. Then the attacker can guess two  
passwords pw’ and new pw’ and use the guessed values to get RA’ = pw’ ⊕ (RA ⊕ pw) and  
RA’’ = new pw’ ⊕ (RA ⊕ new pw). If RA’ = RA’’, the attacker gets the pw and new pw at the  
same time. 
 
Denial of service attack: The attacker can select a random number c to compute (RA ⊕ new  
pw ⊕ c) and send (RA ⊕ pw || RA ⊕ new pw ⊕ c) to Bob in the Step 1. Bob will get  
(new pw ⊕ c) by computing RA ⊕ (RA ⊕ new pw ⊕ c) in the Step 2. Finally, Alice  
sends (H(KA, RB) ⊕ new pw) to Bob in the Step 3. The attacker intercepts it and sends  
(H(KA, RB) ⊕ new pw ⊕ c) to Bob. Bob will accept (new pw ⊕ c) is a new password  
because he uses (new pw ⊕ c) to retrieve the true verifier H(KA, RB). 
 
Known-key attack: Once the past session key KA or KB is compromised by the attacker, the  
attacker can get new pw and use it to impersonate Alice to communicate with Bob. 
a. Once the past session key KA or KB is compromised, the attacker can compute H(KA, RB) 
⊕ (H(KA, RB) ⊕ new pw) to get new pw in the Step 3. Note that KA = KB. 
b. Similarly, once the used password pw is compromised, the attacker can compute pw ⊕ 
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(RA ⊕ pw) ⊕ (RA ⊕ new pw) to get new password new pw in the Step 1. 
 
3. Our scheme 
In this section, we shall a new password change protocol. The parameters are same as 
Chang et al.’s protocol. 
 
3.1 A new password change protocol 
Step 1: Alice → Bob: (RA ⊕ pw || RB ⊕ new pw) 
Alice selects two random numbers a and b and computes RA = ga mod p and RB = gb 
mod p. Alice sends (RA ⊕ pw || RB ⊕ new pw) to Bob. 
Step 2: Bob → Alice: RC || H(Key1, RA, (RB ⊕ new pw), IDB, IDA) 
Bob sends (RC || H(Key1, RA, (RB ⊕ new pw), IDB, IDA)) to Alice, where c is chosen 
by Bob, RC = gc mod p, Key1 = accA gR = mod p, IDA and IDB are Alice and Bob’s 
identities respectively. Note that RA = (RA ⊕ pw) ⊕ pw. 
Step 3: Alice → Bob: H(Key1, Key2, RC, IDA, IDB) 
Alice computes Key1 = caaC gR = mod p and verifies whether H(Key1, RA, (RB ⊕ new 
pw), IDB, IDA) is correct or not. If it is true, Alice computes Key2 = cbbC gR = mod p and 
sends (H(Key1, Key2, RC, IDA, IDB)) to Bob. 
Step 4: Bob can select a candidate new pw’ to retrieve RB’. And then Bob computes Key2’ = 
cbc
B gR
'' = mod p. If H(Key1, Key2’, RC, IDA, IDB) is equal to H(Key1, Key2, RC, IDA, 
IDB), Bob gets the correct new password new pw; otherwise, Bob can re-do this action 
until he gets the correct password. Note that the length of a new password is short, 
therefore this step has to be finished in a polynomial time. If it is not, Bob can reject it. 
 
3.2 Security analysis 
Password guessing attack: The attacker can intercept the messages (RA ⊕ pw || RB ⊕ 
new pw), (RC || H(Key1, RA, (RB ⊕ new pw), IDB, IDA)) and (H(Key1, Key2, RC, IDA, IDB))  
from the communication channel. The attacker cannot make password guessing attack on our  
protocol even if the attacker guesses pw and new pw at the same time, because the attacker 
has no the related verification data and faces the discrete logarithm problem. 
 
Denial of service attack: The attacker uses a random number c to replace with H(Key1, Key2,  
RC, IDA, IDB). Although Bob cannot reject it in no time, Bob still can find this weakness in a  
polynomial time. 
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Known-key attack: If one of Key1 and Key2 is compromised, and the attacker intercepts the  
message (RA ⊕ pw || RB ⊕ new pw), (RC || H(Key1, RA, (RB ⊕ new pw), IDB, IDA)) and  
(H(Key1, Key2, RC, IDA, IDB)), the attacker still cannot get the new password except all the  
session keys are compromised. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, authors show that Chang et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the off-line 
password guessing, denial of service and known-key attacks respectively. Authors also 
propose a new password change protocol to withstand all the threats of security.. 
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